In this paper we formalize the information acquisition process by a potential bidder and its relationship with the target rm's capital structure. We show that debt increases prior to an acquisition are negatively related to the precision of the bidder's information. Incumbent managers, by means of leverage, o set shareholders' losses derived from information acquisition about the rm's prospects by potential acquirors. This explanation for the use of capital structure to deter rivals for control complements the ones provided by the existent literature. We test our model with a sample of 739 U.S. targets of hostile tender o ers, and show that informational variables such as toehold size and nature of target and bidder industries are signi cant determinants of the decision to adjust leverage. Additionally, w e provide evidence on the e ects of capital structure on bid prices. The paper shows that target rms display slightly higher debt levels than their industry peers, and that target rms signi cantly reduce leverage in the year prior to the tender o er announcement. The latter result indicates that leverage favors entrenchment prior to battles for control, although incumbent managers use gearing to bene t from the takeover when its announcement is imminent.
Introduction
Extant literature on takeovers has tried to investigate the role of the target rm'snancial policy in deterring or, at least taking advantage of potential acquirors. The rst e ect of a debt increase in the dates preceding battles for control is on the rm's ownership structure. Leverage is a way for the incumbent management to increase its proportional equity o wnership and thus its control over the takeover outcome Harris and Raviv 1988 , Stulz 1988 , Israel 1992 On the other hand, it is said, leverage a ects the distribution of cash ows to the target securityholders. Since the market price of debt re ects the potential gains accruing to the target rm if a control contest succeeds, a portion of the synergistic gains are captured by incumbent shareholders because of the e ect of debt on the total rm value. Therefore the probability o f a c hange in control is negatively related to leverage Israel 1991.
A third e ect of debt has been identi ed by Stulz 1988. As the rm increases its debt to equity ratio, equityholders bear more risk since the probability of default increases. At the same time, debt reduces the total value of equity, so it becomes cheaper for the bidder to get control. These two opposite e ects must be balanced by target management in order to deter rivals for control or to maximize rm value. This paper explores another possible consequence of leverage changes before acquisitions. Our basic idea is that incumbent managers favor information acquisition about the rm by potential rivals when it is in the incumbent shareholders' best interest. One possible way of allowing such information gathering is by means of direct negotiation between target and rival managers. Through leverage, incumbent managers a ect the riskiness of the equity, and thus the accuracy of the rival's valuation of the deal. At the same time, the additional debt that is taken on directly a ects stock prices as a result of the trade-o between risk and probability of default. Therefore the optimal debt level is chosen so as to mitigate the cost of debt deterrence of potential acquirors with its bene ts bid price increases. The degree of leverage displayed by target rms upon tender o er announcements should then be closely related to the quality of the information in the bidder's hand regarding the target rm's growth opportunities, as well as the target information about the bidder's characteristics and their e ects on the potential synergies accruing to the target rm.
We posit a model in which capital structure is designed once the rm faces a takeover threat, and we assume that the party i n c o n trol derives private bene ts that are decreasing in leverage. Potential acquirors gather the same information as incumbents, but they are able to monitor the rm's prospects and therefore the expected value of equity they intend to acquire. Once securities are priced, we assume that the rival rm is able to ascertain the future cash ows more accurately than can incumbents. In real life, investment banks play a k ey role in acquisitions and acquirors are in general of a bigger size when compared to targets M rck et Al.. 1988. On the other hand, bidders very often become target shareholders before launching a bid, which is a rst indication of their willingness to learn about their targets.
We show that bidder estimation of the equity v alue, and therefore the bid pro tability, are a ected by the precision of the information the bidder gets. The better the signal, the lower the di erence between what the rival gets and what she pays in expected terms, because as a residual claimant, the acquiror bene ts from the riskiness of the rms assets. The relationship between signal precision and shareholders' perception about the likelihood of a contest for control is, however, non monotonic. For low precisions, probability of the bid and information quality are negatively related. However, at a certain level of accuracy, the bidder gets to know the target rm's prospects so precisely that the bid price she has to pay becomes considerably burdensome, thus reducing the likelihood of an acquisition. The rival for control is willing to acquire information though, because a perceived reduction in the probability of a takeover pushes down the expected bid price, thus making the bid more attractive.
Financial policy serves as a way of modulating the negative consequences of information acquisition on incumbents' pro ts. Firstly, an increase in leverage makes the bid cheaper by reducing the total value of equity. This is the negative e ect from the incumbent shareholders' point of view of debt identi ed by Stulz 1988. Secondly, debt reduces the gains to acquirors via a transfer of cash ows to current bondholders, as in Israel 1991. Additionally, leverage a ects the rival's ability t o i n vestigate the target rm and thus the e ectiveness of her signal. In fact, it reduces the range of values of the synergy for which a bid is pro table and increases rival's expectations about equity v alue under her control. Consequently, incumbent managers select the optimal level of gearing that compensates shareholders for the losses derived from information acquisition. We prove that the optimal debt level is negatively related to the precision of the bidder's signal.
The latter result implies that rms adjust their capital structures when facing battles for control and that such adjustments depend on target and bidder rm characteristics. In particular, the bidder's ability to monitor the target's performance determines leverage and therefore the bid outcome. We test these hypotheses using a sample of 739 U.S. targets of hostile tender o ers in the period 1990-1995. For every target in the sample, we select a matching company with similar size and in the same industry, that is not a tender o er target in the sample period. The methodology allows us to control for signi cant determinants of the decision to acquire another rm di erent from that rm's leverage in particular, Tobin's q, and provides us with results of debt changes driven solely by takeover activity.
Our methodology is similar to Palepu 1986, who uses a probit model with a group of 163 targets and 256 non-targets in order to approximate the population over which the model is tested. However, leverage is measured as the average of the debt to equity ratios in the last three years preceding the event date, so the dynamics of adjustment are not observed. Raad and Ryan 1995 also test for changes in capital structure during control contests, but they do not provide comparisons with either non-target rms or industry averages, which call into question their interpretation of the results. Related literature on this topic also includes Dann We show that target rms are highly levered when compared to their industry peers, especially one or two y ears before the tender o er announcement. However, target rms signi cantly reduce leverage 7,19 relative to the matching rms in the year immediately preceding announcement. The result says that high levels of debt are an indication of managerial entrenchment to restrain potential bidders from takeover attempts. Interestingly, when the battle for control is about to happen, incumbent managers reduce leverage to bene t from the tender o er through increases in the bid price at the cost of decreasing their private bene ts.
As a second step, we estimate an econometric model for the determination of capital structure. We obtain that, especially for the smallest rms in our sample, informational variables signi cantly explain the decision to adjust leverage. In particular, leverage decreases when bidder and target belong to the same industry, that is, when the quality of the bidder is easier to assess, as predicted by the theoretical model. Additionally, we show that toehold size and debt increases are positively related. Therefore, when the bidder's ability t o i n vestigate the target increases as a result of a stake purchase, incumbent managers increase the target's debt level to make shareholders better o in potential control contests. We provide as well a detailed analysis by industry. Finally, we show that bid price and leverage changes are related as predicted by the model. That is, by altering capital structure, information acquisition is less e ective and bid price becomes higher.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we develop our theoretical model; in section 2.1 we describe the basic ingredients; section 2.2 analyzes capital structure of the target rm; in section 2.3 we completely determine bid price and probability o f takeover; in section 3 we analyze the relationship between informational and nancial variables, and in section 4 we consider the optimal amount of information selected by a potential raider. Section 5 establishes the empirical implications derived from the theoretical model, which are then tested in the next sections. In sections 4.1 and 4.2 we study di erences in leverage across targets, and in sections 4.3 and 4.4 we test our econometric model. We conclude in section 5 with some extensions and nal remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Theory

The model
The model consists of two periods. At the beginning of the the rst period t = 1 a n entrepreneur issues debt with face value F and equity to nance a project rm T whose expected net cash ow i s v:The riskiness of the project is modelled by assuming that v is normally distributed with mean and variance 2 ; v N; 2 ; 0: The manager does not have either private information or an equity stake in the rm.
We assume that both debt and equity are fairly priced and, for simplicity, the risk free rate is zero. The project can only be implemented if it is totally funded, which means that the size of the rm is exogenous in our framework.
Also at t = 1, the rm is targeted by a potential bidder rm A who is willing to acquire the company's equity and run it. At this point in time all the parties share the same information, namely the distribution of v:The potential bidder, if she succeeds in gaining control of the rm, is able to increase the expected net cash ows from the project to v + s;where s stands for synergy. The value of s is only known to the bidder, and for the rest of the world, s is drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean and variance 2 s : Later in the paper we simplify this assumption by restricting the values of s to be in the set fs l ; s h g:With a potential bidder threatening rm T's management, target shareholders perceive that, with some positive probability, the rm will be acquired and managed more e ciently. Notice that in the absence of private control bene ts or dilution to incumbent shareholders, the potential bidder will only launch the bid if the e ciency gain compensates her for the bid price to be paid. We further assume that the party in control enjoys private bene ts CF; where C 0 F 0, C 0 0 = 0. This assumption stresses the disciplinary role of debt nancing because it reduces free cash ow.
Another interpretation of the bidder's identity w ould say that there exists a population of potential acquirors for the rm and only those for which the acquisition is pro table will compete in a control contest.
The intention to acquire the target may be revealed to incumbent shareholders in a v ariety o f w ays. The rival may directly publish such a n i n tention in order to take soundings regarding incumbent managers reaction to the announcement. Section 13d of the Williams Act requires any person who has acquired more than 5 per cent o f a n y equity security to disclose certain information to the issuer of the security and to the exchanges on which the security is traded. In particular the purchaser must divulge her intention to acquire such issuer. Thus toeholders may easily be identi ed as potential acquirors 1 .
1 Empirical literature on the announcement e ects of 13d lings includes Choi 1991, who tries to The rm may also become a takeover target when some other rms are competing to enter the company's industry because of diversi cation motives or empire-building. Finally, takeover being a disciplinary device, incumbent shareholders associate a positive probability of being taken over to mismanagement relative to other rms in the industry.
In either case, the potential bidder is willing to reveal her identity only when, by so doing, she is able to monitor the potential target more closely. T oeholds are a clear example of this situation. By becoming a large shareholder, acquisition of information is much easier. The downside of this strategy is that, at the same time, target shareholders get to know the identity of a potential raider. Therefore we assume that at the beginning of the second period t = 2, the acquiror receives a signal about the project cash ows, e , where corr e ;e v 8 :
= 1with probability p = 0with probability 1 , p that is, the signal is perfect with probability p, otherwise the bidder learns nothing regarding the rm's asset value. The probability p 2 0; 1 will be referred to as the signal precision. The realization of e is not observed by the incumbent managers, and it costs Ip for the potential acquiror to obtain information with precision p, where I 0 p 0, I 1 = + 1; I 0 0 = + 1. However p, the probability that the bidder enjoys perfect information, is common knowledge. The additional information conveyed by the signal is the result of costly investigation, large shareholder monitoring or cross-communication potential bidder-target rm.
The arrival of new information determines the decision on whether to bid or not.
Clearly, rm A will launch the o er when E A jI 0;where A denotes bidder pro ts after takeover completion. From the shareholders point of view, the decision to tender their shares is contingent upon the bid price. Here we assume that bids are not contested and incumbent shareholders follow their management advice. Bid price is the result of negotiation between the raider and the target managers.
Finally, at the end of the second period t = 3, a conditional bid for a hundred percent of the target rm's shares is announced, and payo s are given to the parties. The timing outlined above is depicted in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 isolate the e ect of toehold trading using a sample of 13d lings in the period 1982-1985, accounting for a positive v aluation e ect. Eysell 1990 quanti es it calculating abnormal returns on the day o f 13d ling announcement, nding a signi cant 4.79 excess return. With a di erent sample, Mikkelson and Ruback 1985 nd a 3.40 abnormal return.
We assume no taxes or bankruptcy costs. This assumption implies that, as of t = 1 , the rm capital structure is irrelevant, so any amount of debt can be issued without a ecting rm value. However, as leverage increases, so does the riskiness of equity. I f a risk-averse, potential acquiror, is seeking to purchase all of rm T's equity, higher leverage will be a useful tool to deter A, since equity becomes riskier. The point w e make in this paper is that, even with risk-neutral bidders, debt a ects the rival's ability to monitor the target rm because equity i s n o w more volatile. Capital structure is no longer irrelevant when rm A enters, and the incumbent manager must balance the positive e ect of leverage entry deterrence against its costs default.
Capital Structure without the threat of a takeover
After securities are issued, but before t = 2 and without a takeover threat, equity v alue is only a ected by the rm expected cash ows and leverage. Let F denote the face value of debt issued at t = 1 :We assume F 0 note that this assumption is not trivial since v is normally distributed. Let K be the equity v alue. Then K after equity i s issued is:
Now it su ces to use the properties of the normal density:
where is the distribution function for the standard normal and f is the unconditional density function for v:After some algebra 2 this yields: ; where x = 0 x: After changing variable to = x, , use the fact that, in a standard normal, x x = , 0 x.
The hazard ratio 3 at F represents the probability that the rm defaults if leverage increases in nitesimally from F, given that the rm is solvent 4 at F. S o HF; ; i s a measure of default risk that depends on gearing.. Lemma 1 in the Appendix shows that HF; ; is an increasing function: future default is more likely for high levels of debt, given that the rm is currently able to meet such p a yments.
Expression 1 says that equityholders require the expected cash ows to the project less debt payments, plus a default premium that depends positively on the cash ows volatility and the debt level. Two remarks are in order: rst, from the results in Lemma 1, E t=1 K is always positive, which means that shareholders nance the cost of the project when it is less than : Second, equity v alue is decreasing in F, i.e. compensation for default risk increase does not o set the share of the project that is given to bondholders.
Equity v alue at t = 1 is decreasing and convex in F and increasing and concave i n :
The previous result is not new, although expression 1 shows clearly the two e ects of leverage on shareholders wealth.
For the next sections, it will be useful to denote by Mx; y; z the expected value of equity for a company with normally distributed cash ows mean y, standard deviation z given that cash ows exceed x: Hence Israel 1991 interprets as the bidder's bargaining power. Alternatively it can be interpreted as the market perceived probability that the bid will fail. The parameter depends on the relative size of the target, the rival management expertise and legal considerations.
Underlying expression 3 it is our assumption that all synergistic gains are split between initial and new securityholders of the target rm. Debt is fairly priced and represents a zero NPV investment for bondholders. Thus, bond price at t = 1 captures any takeover gain re ected in a higher expected debt payo . Consequently, through nancing at t = 1 ; incumbent shareholders get all the synergistic gains that correspond to target securityholders. The probability of a bid occurring will then be the probability that the raider makes positive pro ts, which implies: The expected bid price includes two terms: the rst one is the stock price if the bid fails; second, when the bid succeeds with probability 1 , current shareholders get the expected equity v alue conditional on the bid being pro table. Again, this last term can be rewritten in terms of hazard rates.
Indeed, the expected bid price will be the actual bid price at t = 3 ;since any o w of information that occurs between t = 1 and t = 3 has already been considered. When information about the bidder's quality is disperse, the probability that she is a high type rival increases given that she is willing to bid and at the same time a takeover becomes more likely. I n tuitively, when stockholders are uncertain about the identity o f the bidder, they will require a bid price that compensates them if the bidder is of very high ability. Shareholders know that their downside uncertainty probability that the rival's synergy is too low is resolved when the low quality raider abstains from bidding. Another nal implication of Proposition 1 is that potential acquirors gain from secrecy both in their intentions and in the synergies of the acquisition.
More interestingly, bid price increases with the signal precision, when p is su ciently high precision 5 . As the signal becomes less informative, takeover pro ts get lower for the bidder, since the target is then less valuable for her. Therefore, incumbent shareholders require a lower bid price. If the signal precision is too low, however, target equityholders perceive that the average synergy is high enough to make the bid pro table for the acquiror, even when she remains uninformed. Hence a further reduction in the signal precision increases the bid price. The second e ect of information acquisition is on the market perceived probability of a future takeover.
The probability of a takeover is decreasing increasing in the signal's precision, for p p p p .
When launching a bid, the raider is buying stock v olatility. Since A knows more about the rm's cash ows, her valuation of the equity is higher than that of the stockholders, since she knows more precisely whether the rm will default or not given the current leverage. Such a di erence imposes a loss on the target's account, that must be compensated by a higher bid price. Otherwise, incumbent managers oppose the bid. From the bidder's perspective, more precise information has two opposite e ects: on the one hand, the probability o f a c hange in control probability that the synergy accrues today to stockholders increases for p p ; this is the positive e ect of the signal. On the other hand, better information implies higher bid price for p p a t t = 3 this is a negative e ect of the signal on the bidder's pro ts 6 . 5 The maximum value of F ,s, 1, F,s, M F , s; ; i s l o wer than 0:5, which implies that at most, Ip = 0 :5 , hence p is close enough to zero. 6 The intuition is the reverse for p p
The next proposition highlights the relationship between leverage and managerial objectives:
Israel 1991 The probability of a takeover is decreasing in F In other words, by increasing leverage, the threshold value of the synergy s 0 such that a takeover becomes pro table for the bidder increases.
Information acquisition and capital structure
In this section we analyze how incumbent managers can a ect the outcome of the contest for control through capital structure, and in particular the in uence of leverage on the raider's decision to acquire information on the target when such information is costly.
Since debt is fairly price, the face value of bonds that maximize the value of the rm is the same as the one that maximizes the value of equity. The potential synergy s is captured by incumbent shareholders, target bondholders and the bidder. Hence, assuming that the manager's objective function is equity maximization, managers will choose F so as to force the potential raider to pay the maximum price while making the bid pro table.
Furthermore, managers receive private bene ts for being in control at t = 3 : Such bene ts are decreasing in the rm's gearing. Hence, leverage a ects the managerial objective function, rst, by determining the ex-ante probability of a bid occurring, and therefore the probability that equity v alue rises; second, because bid price depends on the stock v olatility and thus on leverage; third, through private bene ts of control.
In order to ease the calculations in the following sections, let us assume that s, the increase in rm's value induced by the acquisition, can take only two possible values: s 8 : = s h with probability qF = s l with probability 1 , qF where s l 0 is such that it is never pro table for the bidder to attempt to acquire rm T, i.e. A s l ; p 0 8p, and where s h s l is high enough to guarantee positive expected pro ts for the bidder regardless of the quality of her information, A s h ; p 0 8p. This assumption implies that qF represents the probability of rm T being taking over as well, and from previous sections q 0 F 0; 0 qF 1, lim F!1 qF = 0. We further assume that qF is such that ,q 0 F q F . Finally, conditional on the bid being announced, the expected bid price becomes now: notice that, under this simpli cation, the bid price increases 7 with Let E s T F be the incumbent manager's objective function. It consists of the expected increase in the equity v alue at t = 1 plus private bene ts. From previous sections, expected value of equity will be as in 1 if A decides not to bid for T, otherwise target shareholders receive an amount equal to the bid price with probability qF. Additionally, target managers only enjoy private control bene ts in the rm is not acquired at t = 3. Therefore: E s T F = 1 , qF CF + M + qFB , M 8 And managers will choose the level of debt F ;such that:
Debt negatively a ects the return on equity b y reducing the probability of the rm being acquired and therefore being managed more e ciently. Additionally, the use of free cash ow for private purposes is less likely. Finally, equity claim on the target rm is lower with high leverage, and therefore both equity v alue without takeover threat and bid price get lower too. However, debt provides entrechment to incumbent managers and increase the probability that they remain in control and enjoy private bene ts. Therefore there exists a debt level F that trades o optimally the gains and losses from leverage. There exists an optimal debt level, F = F 0, that maximizes T F.
The bidder's information a ects the optimal capital structure in the following way.
Under the simplifying assumption that p a ects only the acquiring rm perception regarding the target asset value, but not the probability that the acquisition takes place, bid price gets higher the more accurate such information is. Therefore target managers are likely to substitute debt for equity in order to increase the probability qF. However, as the rm increases its leverage, the value of the equity in case the takeover threat is not realized decreases. The former e ect depends on the quality of the information the bidder may acquire, while the latter is independent of it. Which e ect prevails is resolved in the next proposition. Optimal leverage and signal precision are negatively related .
To provide further insight i n to the relationship between information quality o f l e v erage, suppose rm A is perfectly informed about rm T's asset value. Being that the case, the acquiror knows with certainty whether the target rm will default, and the only e ect of the target's high leverage is that the expected value of the residual claim on rm T if the takeover takes place reduces, and so does the expected bid price. Suppose instead that information precision p equals zero. In this case the acquiror gathers the same information as target shareholders do. A leverage increase both reduces the value of the residual claim on the target rm for the acquiror, and increases her perceived probability that the target rm will default. Therefore the increase in the bid price will now be smaller. Hence, we i n tuitively expect that as rm A acquires better information, the debt level that maximizes incumbent manager's pro ts decreases.
Extension: endogenous information acquisition
In the previous analysis, we w ere considering the particular case in which p, the quality of the information the bidder may acquire, is constant and cannot be strategically chosen by the potential acquiror. In what follows, we concentrate on the simultaneous decision faced by target managers and the bidding rm regarding the optimal level of debt and the optimal information precision, respectively.
The analysis assumes that once the takeover threat is identi ed by rm T's managers, the bidding rm optimally selects the quality of the information to be acquired. Simultaneously, the target management decides to alter the rm's capital structure. Such a one-shot game is a proper generalization of a more realistic situation in which there would be dynamic adjustments both in leverage and information accuracy.
Once the decision to acquire information about rm T is taken, and considering that such acquisition is costly, the potential acquiror is aware that the nal choice on whether to announce a bid or not is contingent upon the signal received. Therefore, the expression for the bidder's expected pro ts is: ,qFB
The cost Ip is paid even when the bidder decides not to initiate the acquisition. However, only with probability qF will the acquiror pay the bid price B, enjoy control bene ts CF and gain control over the target rm. The expected equity v alue if rm T i s t a k en over depends, as in the previous section, on the information precision. Note that the e ect of leverage on bidder's pro ts is twofold: debt reduces the probability of the acquisition, the amount of private bene ts and the expected bid price. However, leverage enhances the gains from acquiring information, since the marginal gain from increasing p is higher the more levered rm T is.
Being p an endogenous variable, we need conditions to guarantee that any simultaneous choice is optimal i.e. Nash equilibrium and stable. The equilibrium F ; p is stable and satis es 11.
Therefore, an equilibrium exists if CF 1 , qF , expected control bene ts under a takeover threat, are increasing in F: The equilibrium breaks down, for instance, when the bidder knows with certainty that she will never launch a bid even when she acquires very precise information. In this situation there is no link between information precision and leverage, and thus a Nash equilibrium fails to exist. If, in the other hand, the expected bene ts of control decrease with leverage, then it may happen that rm T takes on in nite amounts of debt, thus driving the probability of the acquisition down to zero. A Nash equilibrium does not exist in such a case.
Testable implications
In this section we analyze the empirical implications of the model already presented, establishing a formal link between the theory and the actual nancial policy of takeover targets.
Our results highlight the importance that the identity of the bidder has in determining the optimal nancial policy of the rm. We h a ve shown that a leverage increase and the bidder's information about the target quality a ect target shareholders wealth in opposite directions. Additionally, while bidders are always willing to hide their type namely the takeover synergies, target shareholders tend to prefer information disclosures that would allow a potential bidder to value their rm accurately. Therefore, changes in nancial policy of rms that become takeover targets are closely related to the ability of potential bidders to acquire information about the rm. In particular, growing rms for which cash ows are riskier will display l o wer levels of gearing 8 . Additionally, those targets in high technology industries need less debt to bene t from forthcoming battles for control. Notice that our model does not postulate leverage as a means of preventing takeovers, but as a way of maximizing target shareholders' gains. Financial policy encourages takeovers by increasing rm value, and at the same time makes shareholders better o by an increase in the price to be paid for the target stock. Thus, we h a ve shown that, ceteris paribus, target rms use less leverage when the bidder is able to monitor the target rm more closely. In particular, toeholds and leverage should be negatively related. This is similar to a situation where acquiror includes management of the target company. The level of expertise of both target and bidder managers a ect the amount of debt issued by the target rm: long-lived target rms will issue more debt; e cient bidders will face low-levered target rms.
The empirical study we carry out in the next section tries to shed some light on the testable implications listed in the preceding paragraphs. We are interested in studying the nancial policy of target rms relative to industry peers, and the relationship between changes in leverage in the years immediately before the control contest and variables measuring the bidder's ability to acquire information, surprises concerning the identity of the bidder, and the position of the rm in the industry. Furthermore, and since our model provides us with closed form solutions for the tender o er variables, we will analyze the relationship between leverage and bid price, and between leverage and the probability of becoming a takeover target.
6 The evidence
Data and methodology
We identify a nal sample of 739 U.S. rms in the Security Data Corporation SDC databases that face non-friendly tender o ers during 1990-1995. We only consider hostile or unsolicited deals to ensure the strategic role of leverage before the acquisition. Comment and Schwert 1997 have studied the characteristics that di erentiate hostile versus friendly targets, and conclude that there is evidence supporting entrenchment and bargaining strategy as explanations for hostility. Our theoretical model applies to managers that enjoy private control bene ts and who therefore behave strategically when dealing with a potential acquiror.
The preliminary sample consists of those cases classi ed as tender o ers, tendermergers or two-tier o ers by SDC. For those deals for which managerial attitude was not available, we c hecked with the Wall Street Journal for any reference to the target managers' response. Our initial sample consisted of 942 takeover announcements. Our sample includes an announcement only if it corresponds to the rst attempt to acquire control of the target. We therefore eliminate 203 announcements from the initial sample because they correspond either to second or subsequent bids made by the same initial bidders, or to competing bids.
Since, in previous sections, we postulate that defensive restructuring in capital structure should anticipate takeover attempts, we c hecked in the Wall Street Journal for articles describing the bidder's interest in acquiring the target. Only in nine cases did we nd reported interest dating from one year before the tender o er announcement. Amongst these articles we do not consider references to 13d lings detailing large block acquisitions. Thus we infer that only initial stakes are employed by potential bidders to reveal their intentions.
We estimate our econometric model using successful bids, as well as failed bids. The latter category includes targets sold to a white knight, to other bidder, and targets that remain independent. A bid is considered successful when the raider acquires eighty p e r cent of the shares sought. We obtain accounting variables for the individual rms in the sample from Compustat les. In particular, we measure leverage as the ratio of total debt to shareholders' equity. Total debt is calculated as total long term debt 9 plus debt in current liabilities, which is de ned as the total amount of short-term notes and the current portion of long term debt due in one year. Shareholders' equity includes common and preferred shareholders' interest in the company 10 . P alepu 1986 and Ambrose and Megginson 1992, for instance, measure leverage as the ratio of long term debt of a rm to its equity. Dann and DeAngelo calculate the ratio of book value of long term debt to total assets. M rck et al. 1988 use the value of long term debt on total market value.
Additionally, w e retrieve data on earnings before interest and taxes, total assets, return on assets and stock price performance. Descriptive statistics on all these measures are reported in Table 1 , where we show the median sample values relative to the population of rms in the S&P500. The targets in our sample display relatively low profitability but insigni cant stock price outperformance. Franks and Mayer 1996 show that successful hostile bid targets record almost identical price performance to that of comparable non-targets in the same industry. W e also show that earnings per share are consistently negative t wo y ears before the takeover announcement, but they are positive one year prior to the bid, in anticipation of price runups when the bid takes place. Fo-cusing on years t = ,3 t o t = ,1 relative to the o er announcement, Table I shows that target rms' prices outperform the market index, while displaying negative earnings per share. This is an indication of market perceived growth opportunities but ine cient management. Finally, when compared to the S&P500, our average target rm is small in size.
Insert T able I
To provide further insight i n to these results, we make pairwise comparison by selecting, for each target rm in our nal sample, a non-target matching rm. For a matching rm to be chosen, we rank by size all the rms with the same four SIC code digits in the Compustat les in the year preceding the takeover announcement and we c hoose the rm closest in size, above or below, to the rm in our sample. We c hecked that the selected company w as not a takeover target in the 5 years preceding the announcement date and in the 5 years following that date. In order to do that, we search for references in WSJ to bids launched for the chosen rm's stock. A new matching rm is chosen if there is a bid outstanding in the aforementioned period. We obtain a sample of 738 matching rms that parallels the nancial structure of those in the original sample.
Table II displays accounting variables for targets and non-targets with data available in the Compustat les. In contrast with the evidence in Comment and Schwert 1995, we nd a statistically signi cant di erence in market to book ratios for target rms 2.11 vs. non-targets 1.91, with p , value for the di erence 0:06, re ecting higherthan-median growth opportunities for target rms. Our procedure is di erent to the aforementioned authors' since we do not compare our sample of target rms to the whole population, but only to a subsample. Additionally, such di erences can be motivated by di erent time periods 1977 to 1991 in Comment and Schwert 1995.
Consistent with Table I , target rms earn negative return on equity relative to nontargets, but stock returns are signi cantly higher in the ve y ears preceding the o er announcement.
Insert T able II
Finally, data on toeholds are obtained from SDC together with Wall Street Journal references. Since stake purchases are only reported at announcement date and only at purchase date if larger than 5, we generally ignore the date at which the bidder-target relationship started. However, SDC reports stakes 6 months prior to the bid. In 732 cases out of 739, the bidder approaches the target in the six months preceding the bid announcement.
Capital Structure of Target Firms
To assess signi cant v ariations in capital structure due to the takeover threat, we need to measure leverage relative to a subset of non-target rms. We are tempted to use industry averages as comparable items. However, this introduces a bias in our study since some industries strategically time their o ers to take advantage of misvaluations. We could easily be comparing our target rms to a population of target and non-target rms, something that would clearly distort our results and our ability to detect signi cant restructuring.
Extant literature on capital structure and takeovers characterizes target rms relative to comparable companies. Palepu 1986 concludes that the rms in his study display low growth and low leverage, because the coe cients of these two v ariables in a probit model where the likelihood of being a target is the explanatory variable are negative.
Ambrose and Meggingson 1992, Mikkelson and Partch 1989 and M rck et al. 1988
follow the same approach. The methodology employed here enhances the reliability o f our results. Further, by adjusting leverage measures by matching rms, we are able to furnish some empirical evidence on the dynamic adjustments in capital structure of rms facing battles for control.
Insert T able III Table III shows the median debt to equity ratios and matching company adjusted debt to equity ratios for the rms in the sample with availability of data in the Compustat les. We provide ratios for the ve y ears preceding the o er as well as the debt to equity ratio at announcement date. As shown in the Table, rms in our sample are slightly more levered when compared to non-targets. The result is inconsistent with Palepu 1986, who does not provide a separate analysis, and Comment and Schwert 1995, who only report mean debt-to-equity ratios. M rck et al. 1988, on the other hand, do not nd signi cant di erences between the debt ratios of target rms of hostile takeovers and the ones for 454 Fortune 500 non-target companies. Whilst this may seem contradictory, notice that both M rck et al. 1988 and Palepu 1986 only consider long term debt in their measures of leverage.
Particularly interesting is the fact that the di erences in leverage reduce over the years preceding the announcement and are relatively small 0,38 at announcement date. By industry, results are not signi cant in general due mainly to a lack of degrees of freedom. In spite of this, the di erences across industries at announcement date are not negligible. Wholesale and Retail Trade are the highest levered industries, while Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining display a ratio of 46. The general result is also illustrated in Figure 2 .
In Table 3 we analyze changes in leverage for the same window. Raad and Ryan 1996 report non-signi cant c hanges of leverage in the last three years preceding the takeover announcement and including the announcement y ear. We obtain similar results in nominal terms, namely that targets do not adjust leverage in the last three years, although leverage increases signi cantly in years -5 and -4. When compared to their industry peers, it turns out that target rms reduce their debt levels in the year before the o er. If we consider that bidders approach a potential target as much as one year before launching a bid, the results in Table 3 highlight the strategic role of leverage in control contest.
Insert T able IV
By industry, only Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Mining display signi cant c hanges in year -1. In absolute terms there are not signi cant c hanges in leverage, the same result as we h a ve obtained for the overall sample.
The rationale for our results is, in the light of the theoretical implications, as follows. If probability of being a takeover target and leverage are negatively related, then takeover targets, that is, those rms that really become involved in battles for control, should display l o w leverage when compared with the situation in which the market for corporate control is non-existent. As Stulz 1988 suggests, high leverage makes a rm a good takeover target because of the reduction in the equity stake to be acquired for a given rm size. The evidence is also consistent with Israel 1992 and Harris and Raviv 1988, since a leverage increase also increases the management control over a potential acquisition. High debt ratios refelct as well an intent b y the target of o setting the positive e ects on bidder's pro ts of acquiring information regarding the rms they acquire. As shown in Sections 3 and 4, by levering up the rm, target managers increase the riskiness of the equity and avoid information acquisition by future rivals for control.
Besidesr, Table IV also shows that takeover targets adjust their capital structures by debt reductions when a potential bidder shows her intentions to acquire the target's equity. Once the control contest becomes imminent, debt reductions bene t target shareholders because: they make the bidder's information more valuable, they increase the acquiror's bid, and they are a means of transferring synergistic gains from the acquiror to the current bondholders Israel 1991.
Insert T able V
In Table 4 we analyze leverage ratios by y ear of announcement. Years 1993-1994 are a hot period in the market for corporate control. Previous years display a completely di erent pattern: target rms heavily adjust their capital structure 34,80 reduction in leverage ratios with respect to the matching companies. Afterwards there are not signi cant di erences between targets and non-targets. By size, results are signi cant especially for the largest rms in the sample see Table VI. Insert T able VI
Cross-sectional analysis
We are interested in this subsection in the determinants of the changes in capital structure for target rms in our sample. Matching company adjusted di erences only illustrates the role of leverage as a managerial device to make shareholders better o when facing takeover threats. In what follows, we provide some evidence on the di erences across target rms.
For a given level of bidder's knowledge regarding the target's value, Section 2 in the paper shows, in line with Israel 1991, that a rm is more likely to be taken over the lower its debt level. We i n tend to test this proposition as a rst statge in the analysis, particularly because it is of a great interest to analyze how c hanges in leverage a ect the probability that a rm faces a battle for control.
We replicate Palepu's 1986 logit estimation of the likelihood of an acquisition with our sample of targets and matching rms we estimate a probit regression. Results are reported in Table VII . Unlike P alepu 1986, we are controllin for size and consequently for size-related variables, as market-to-book ratio and trading volume. It is not surprising, however, that the coe cients for these two v ariables are not signi cant in explaining the probability of being acquired. Leverage one year before tender o er announcement is negatively related to the likelihood of an acqusition, in line with Palepu 1986, and we nd that stock price performance of a company in the year preceding the tender o er is a signi cant determinant of the decision to acquire such rm. Bidders tend to target cheap rms that perform poorly in the market. Together with the pairwise comparisons in Table II, Table VII re ects a strong skewness in the distribution of abnormal returns 11 .
Insert T able VII
To sum up, empricial results are consistent with the theoretical statements in Israel 1991 and this paper, that negatively relate debt to the probability of an acquisition. Our next objective is to clarify the cross-sectional determinants of the decision to adjust debt-to-equity ratios preciding tender o ers.
Three are the main determinants of the decision to alter capital structure that arise from the theoretical part of this paper. First we h a ve shown that the higher the leverage the lower the probability of being a takeover target. The statement has been tested in the previous subsections: target rms reduce signi cantly their debt levels when control contests are imminent. However, the causality b e t ween this two v ariables is still not clear.
Second, the uncertainty about the bidder's quality is indirectly related to leverage through the bid price and thus the willingness of the rival to bid. Proposition 2 says that a takeover is less likely the lower the accuracy of shareholders' perception about the rm's prospects after a change in control. Therefore, incumbent managers alter capital structure towards more leverage to maximize shareholders' gain.
Finally, leverage and the bidder's signal quality are negatively related. Intuitively, targets will increase leverage when the ability of the potential rival to monitor the rm is high. A high-levered company is riskier; therefore the outcome of the bidder's screening is of low quality, and so are her pro ts.
Measuring those variables is not an easy task. To implement the econometric analysis, we proxy the uncertainty about the bidder quality using two v ariables. The rst variable measures the participation of target rm managers both as bidder and target. That is, we consider those bids for which the bidding company includes in its board of directors some member of the target's board. In 27,32 of the announcements we consider some target managers have active participation as bidders. Intuitively, this variable is a double-edged sword because it is an indication on how precisely the bidder is informed about the target, as well as how accurately the target can forecast the bidder's synergies. The results will depend on whether target-and-bidder board members play as raiders or saviors for the target rm. The second proxy is a dummy v ariable that takes value 1 for high technology companies. High-tech rms have higher risk exposure and so their future pro tability is more di cult to forecast. In our sample, 9,97 of the targets have this feature.
To measure the quality of the bidder's signal we identify those announcements for which both bidder and target belong to the same industry. In these situations synergies are higher and the bidder's ability to assess them is also higher. We expect the relationship between debt changes and industry identity to be negative i f w e assume that bidders in the same industry as their targers know more about the target's value. However, we can also expect that in such a situation, target shareholders are better aware of the motives for the acquisition and therefore better informed about the potential synergies, in which case the coe cient for the variable should be positive.. The regressor takes value 1 when the SIC codes for target and bidder four digits are identical. It so happens in 62,29 of the cases.
Additionally, it is clear that the best way to monitor a rm closely is to become a large shareholder. One reason why bidders may b e i n terested in purchasing the target's stock in the open market before launching a bid is that by doing so, they have access to some information that only accrues to shareholders, and secondly they participate in corporate decisions. On the other hand, acquisitions of big stakes by potential raiders signals to incumbent shareholders the possibility of imminent takeover. This is one reason why w e observe toeholds being acquired generally in the six months that precede the bid announcement.
We measure toeholds through a dummy v ariable that takes value 1 when it has been acquired, independently of the size of the stake. Further, we consider the size of the stake itself. We expect the dummy v ariable to be positively related to leverage changes. The reason is that having a stake in the target rm identi es the owner as a potential acquiror and reduces incumbents' uncertainty regarding the possible synergies reducint s in Section 2 terminology. Therefore, bid price gets lower and the increase in the likelihood of a battle for control must be compensated by a higher debt to equity ratio. The e ect of the initial stake on the ability of the bidder to acquire information is captured by the toehold size variable. Therefore, we expect the coe cient for this variable to be negative.
Table VIII displays the estimates for the regression of abnormal changes in leverage in the two y ears preceding the o er, on the explanatory variables we h a ve selected. We adjust for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and use non-parametric tests that are insensitive to the variables' distribution.
Insert T able VIII
Except for the industry identity v ariable and the high-tech dummy, all the explanatory variables are signi cant and with the expected signs. Notice that the size of the initial stake is negatively related to increments in leverage, which means that through toeholds incumbent shareholders learn more about the bidder than does the bidder about the target rm. This could be a reason why most bidders do not buy stock i n open market purchases before tender o ers. Industry dummies are not signi cant except for nancial corporations, where debt increases are higher when facing takeover threats.
Since we obtain a signi cant positive relation between target-and-bidder board members existence and leverage changes, and together with the observation by M rck et al. 1988 that targets are relatively smaller we can conclude that the common directors behave i n f a vor of the bidding rm by providing it with information on the company t o be taken over. Notice that following the same intuition, we h o wever obtain the opposite result for the subsample of largest targets.
We also provide results of the estimation by target size. Panels B to E in Table VIII show that the results do not di er dramatically accross rms.
Conclusion
This paper examines the adjustments in capital structure induced by takeover threats. We provide a theoretical framework to analyze the potential acquiror's decision whether to acquire information about their targets and the incumbent management response to the bidder's strategy. Our main insight is that, by increasing leverage, shareholders bene t from future battles for control by transferring cash ows from the rival to current bondholders, by making the bid more expensive and by increasing the riskiness of the equity. Additionally, leverage a ects the e ectiveness of the bidder's monitoring on the target cash ows. Managers choose the optimal debt level that makes the bid pro table for the acquiror whilst extracting the maximum possible gain. The model provides implications for the relationship between debt level preceding a takeover and variables measuring the quality of the acquiror's information.
We carry out an empirical analysis of the results above and show that, on average, target rms are relatively more levered than comparable companies in the same industry and with the same size, but not under takeover pressure. More interestingly, our results con rm that leverage is reduced immediately before a hostile tender o er announcement, which indicates that leverage is used by managers to facilitate a change in control while maximizing shareholders' gains. Such evidence provides signi cant support for the managerial entrenchment h ypothesis. Although the theoretical model predicts that it is the adjustment in capital structure that facilitates the change in control, still the question of the direction of this causality remains. Therefore, we test for the determinants of the decision to reduce leverage in the last two y ears preceding the tender o er announcement. We con rm that target rms do reduce leverage when the bidder has the ability t o investigate the pro tability of the combined merging rms more e ciently. T w o main conclusions arise from the study: rst, bidders may b e i n terested in becoming target shareholders because of the information they can acquire as owners; second, when bidder and target belong to the same industry, target shareholders learn more about their rival than the reverse.
A fundamental issue that has not been discussed here is the role of managerial ownership in the target rm, particularly the di erent incentives that result when incumbent managers are also target shareholders. We neither consider the determinants of the takeover success, nor the e ect of information acquisition on the number of bidders. These elements will be considered in our future work. Table II . Description of the Sample. Accounting variables for target firms of takeover announcements in the year preceeding the takeover announcement, and for the corresponding matching firm in the same period. 'Difference'equals the difference between the corresponding variable for the target company and the corresponding variable for the matching company, where a matching company is chosen among the firms in the same industry (four SIC code digits) and closest in size at tender offer announcement date. Trading Volume is calculated as the average of the Common Shares Traded -Monthly for the years t-3 through t-1 relative to tender offer announcement, divided by the number of all common shares outstanding at yearend. Abnormal Return is calculated as the 5 Year Total Return divided by the 5 Year Total Return for the S&P 500 x 100, calculated one year before tender offer announcement. The total sample of target firms contains all the target firms of hostile tender offers from the US for which data were available in the period 1990-1995 Significance levels are based on two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Probit Regressions relating the Likelihood of a Tender Offer to Leverage and Control Variables. The dependent variable is and indicator function that takes value 1 if the firm is a hostile tender offer target in the sample period 1990-1995, zero otherwise. The independent variables are the debt-toequity ratios from 5 to 1 years before the tender offer announcement, as well as the debt-to-equity ratio in the year the tender offer is announced, and Control Variables. Trading Volume is calculated as the average of the Common Shares Traded -Monthly for the years t-3 through t-1 relative to tender offer announcement, divided by the number of all common shares outstanding at yearend. Abnormal Return is calculated as the 5 Year Total Return divided by the 5 Year Total Return for the S&P 500 x 100, calculated one year before tender offer announcement. The total sample contains all the target firms of hostile tender offers from US for which data were available and the corresponding matching firms in the period 1990-1995. For every firm in the original sample, a matching is chosen among the firms in the same industry (four SIC code digits) and closest in size at tender offer announcement date. Two-tailed p-values are displayed in parentheses. Table VIII . Econometric model estimation. Dependent variable is matching company adjusted increment in debt to equity ratio in the last two years preceeding the takeover announcement, for target firms in the period 1990-1995. 'Bidder Industry' takes value 1 when SIC codes (four digits) for target and bidder firms are equal. 'Toehold Dummy' takes value 1 when 'Toehold Size' is different from zero. 'Target Management' is a dummy variable that equals 1 when bidder company includes target managers. Industry dummies result from the classification in Tables 1 and 2 (Group 1: Agriculture, forestry, fishing and mining; Group 2: Construction; Group 3: Manufacturing; Group 4: Transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary services; Group 5: Wholesale Trade; Group 6: Retail Trade; Group 7: Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; Group 8: Services). Size Quartile 1 represents the smallest firms in the sample, Size Quartile 4 represents the biggest firms in the sample. Significance levels are adjusted for heteroskedasticity with White's estimations, and t-statistics are in parentheses
